Fire Safety and Technology Editorial

 

 

December 2009
 

 

Fireworks in Nightclubs


I enjoy watching fireworks. Last summer I went out on a friend's yacht and we moored in the San Francisco Bay while watching fireworks being launched professionally, from more than one city, over the water, at a safe distance from people, buildings and boats. That was fun and it was safe.

Unfortunately fireworks are also used in unsafe fashion, and we now need to add a new date to the pair of tragic anniversaries of massive disasters: at least 148 people were killed in a fireworks-caused fire in a nightclub in Perm, Russia just two weeks ago (December 5).

Details of the Russian nightclub fire are still sketchy. However, one aspect is clear: the fire was caused by indoor fireworks and swept through the Lame Horse nightclub in the early hours of a Saturday morning. The club was celebrating 8 years in operation. Some 230 party-goers rushed to the club's single exit and many died of smoke inhalation or were trampled. A performance artist juggled "unsanctioned cold-flame pyrotechnical maces"; as he threw them high in the air, the club's plastic ceiling caught fire. The earlier incidents occurred on February 20, 2003 (West Warwick, RI, US, 100 people killed), and December 30, 2004 (Buenos Aires, Argentina, 194 people killed).

In each one of the three cases:
(a) The fireworks were not operated by professional personnel,
(b) The fireworks caused a plastic interior finish material to catch fire: a wall lining in Rhode Island, a ceiling lining in Buenos Aires and a ceiling, apparently, in Perm.
(c) There were no active fire suppression sprinklers and no proper fire alarm systems.
(d) The exits were insufficient.
(e) There were multiple code violations (typically involving materials were unsuitable as interior finish).
(f) There were many people present celebrating (a concert, New Year's, an anniversary); the use of alcohol was common, so that many attendees exhibited somewhat impaired senses.
(g) Following the fire, the owners/operators of the nightclub were arrested and prosecuted; however, the actions at that particular establishment are typical of actions elsewhere in the corresponding area.

Probably each one of these common issues (except for the after effect, of course) would have been enough to bring about the potential for an accident: combining them all makes a disaster that much more likely. In fact, nightclub fires are fairly common throughout the world (a nightclub fire occurred in Indonesia on the same night as the Perm fire and resulted in some 20 fatalities) but the combination of a nightclub and fireworks makes such a fire particularly deadly.

The use of materials that lack the proper fire performance is of particular interest to me. We have had, in the US, adequate (and permanently improving) regulation for interior finish for many years. In spite of this, it would not be unusual to find that code violations associated with interior finish will be found frequently. Thus, it is much more likely to find problems in areas/countries where codes are less stringent and code violations are commonplace. It has been stated that the enforcement of fire safety standards is notoriously poor in Russia, which has had several catastrophic fires at drug-treatment facilities, nursing homes, apartment buildings and nightclubs in recent years. Russia suffers up to 18,000 fire deaths a year, many more fire deaths per capita than in the United States or Western Europe.

I wonder if the indoor use of fireworks should be allowed at all. Somehow it must be possible to have safe indoor use of fireworks, because NFPA has issued NFPA 1126, Standard for the Use of Pyrotechnics before a Proximate Audience. Parts of its scope read: This standard shall provide requirements for the protection of property, operators, performers, support personnel, and the viewing audiences where pyrotechnic effects are used indoors or outdoors with a proximate audience. The purpose of this standard shall be to provide minimum requirements to the operators and manufacturers for the safe operation of pyrotechnic effects. This standard shall apply to the use of pyrotechnics in the performing arts in conjunction with theatrical, musical, or similar productions before a proximate audience, performers, or support personnel. This standard shall apply to any indoor use of pyrotechnics.

That means that some unusual circumstances, I suppose, may exist so that fireworks can be safely used indoors, provided all appropriate protections are in place. It needs to be pointed out that NFPA 1126 requires that the operators shall be properly "qualified" and that the authority having jurisdiction approve, in advance, detailed plans for the display.

It is important to point out also that NFPA 1126 requires that the facility in which indoor fireworks are to be used comply with the requirements of NFPA 101, Life Safety Code. NFPA 101 has very careful requirements for interior finish (in walls and ceilings), which includes a ban on the use of exposed foam plastic (unless the material has met a very severe room-corner test (NFPA 286). NFPA 101 also has requirements for adequate exits and for active fire protection (sprinklers, fire alarm systems) and is well coordinated with NFPA 13 (Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems) and NFPA 72 (National Fire Alarm Code).

It is not unusual for nightclubs to be set up quickly and inexpensively and for the associated safety precautions to be ignored, often with the tacit collusion of local authorities. I hope these three massive tragedies in a single decade will make authorities more vigilant.


Marcelo M. Hirschler


 

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